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Interjections in American and 
Danish courtroom interaction: 





Abstract: This study compares the use of interjections by the defence lawyers 
in an American and a Danish criminal trial during their direct-examination of 
their clients, i.e. the defendants. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses 
it is shown that the Danish lawyer uses interjections much more frequently 
than the American lawyer, and that the interjections used by the American 
lawyer tend to have different interactional functions than those used by the 
Danish lawyer. Thus, while the American lawyer practices a composed and 
transactional style of interaction, the Danish lawyer adopts a fairly loose 
and casual style. The interactional styles of the two lawyers, as seen through 
their use of interjections, are discussed and explained as reflections of central 
cultural traits of the two countries’ legal traditions, drawing, amongst others, 
on the basic divide between common law adversarialism and civil law 
inquisitorialism.
1. Introduction1   
1.1. The no longer so neglected part of speech
After the groundbreaking treatment of interjections in a 1992 special issue of 
Journal of Pragmatics (e.g. Ameka 1992), studies of interjections seem to have 
been gradually accepted as linguistics proper – at least in branches of linguistics 
concerned with meanings and socio-cultural functions (see e.g. Wierzbicka 
2003; Hansen & Heltoft 2011; Velmezova 2011; Goddard 2013; Pei-Jung Lee 
2017; Le Grezause 2017). While the traditional negligence of interjections may 
still constitute an important lesson for linguistics, the question these days is 
not so much – or at least should not be – whether interjections are important 
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or not, but rather what they mean, how they are used, what we can learn from 
them, and so on. This paper deals with aspects of these questions in the special 
context of criminal trial procedures. 
Interjections are widely held to reflect cultural values, perhaps more densely 
than other parts of speech, e.g.:
… far from being universal and ‘natural’ signs which don’t have to be 
learnt, interjections are often among the most characteristic peculiarities 
of individual cultures. (Wierzbicka 2003:285)
Not only are the semantics of individual interjections steeped in culture, the 
norms of how and when to use various kinds of interjections may also be seen 
as reflections of cultural values and practices, or as Wierzbicka has it: 
… no definitions of the kind provided by […] conventional dictionaries 
[…] would teach the reader in what situations wow, gee, ah or phew 
would be inappropriate. (Wierzbicka 2003:287)
1.2. Comparing legal cultures through interjections
The language of courtrooms is regulated by special institutional, legal and 
social norms, as well as strategic considerations of the trial parties (e.g. 
Atkinson & Drew 1979; Drew 1992; Gibbons 2003; Mortensen & Mortensen 
2017). Such features are constitutive elements of what we may consider the 
cultural practices of the courtrooms, embedded in broader languacultural 
(Agar 1996) and indeed legal cultural traditions:
As such, law in any country is formulated, construed and enforced 
through language. Under each legal system, the language that has 
developed for hundreds of years for the purposes of a particular legal 
system reflects the idiosyncratic traits of that legal system and legal 
culture. (Bednarek 2014:32-33)
Thus, the norms of language use in a trial hearing, including for example 
the norms of how and when to use (or avoid) interjections, reflect aspects 
of the legal culture in question. Differences between the legal traditions of 
e.g. the American and the Danish society may be traced in numerous ways 
in the interactional styles employed in the courtrooms, especially by the 
professionals representing the legal institution. In this paper I investigate 
one such linguistic trace, as I compare the use of interjections by the defence 
lawyers in an American and a Danish criminal trial during their examination 
of their clients, i.e. the defendants. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative 
analyses of their use of interjections, I discuss how the differences between 
the lawyers’ interactional styles reflect aspects of the legal cultures of the two 
countries and jurisdictions.  
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2. Courtroom interaction in the USA and in Denmark 
2.1. The American adversarial courtroom
The two major Western legal traditions are the common law system on the 
one hand, which employs what is known as the adversarial system of trial 
and is associated mainly with Anglophone countries, including the USA, 
and the civil law system on the other hand, which employs the inquisitorial 
system of trial and is associated with most of Continental Europe (e.g. 
Damaška 1997; Komter & Malsch 2012; Jackson & Summers 2012; Bednarek 
2014). Differences in ideology, form and practice between the two systems 
abound, one significant aspect being the implications of adversarialism and 
inquisitorialism for how the purpose of truth-seeking is conceived:
Adversarial and inquisitorial procedures are structured around different 
normative views of the trial. Under the adversarial ideal the law is a 
game, courts are where the contest takes place, and the goal of criminal 
procedure is to make sure the outcome is fair, even if the prosecution 
does not uncover the truth […] Under the inquisitorial ideal, the goal of 
the law is fact finding, and the criminal trial is a search for truth. (Kahn 
2004:13)
Truth, then, under the adversarial system of trial, has been dubbed “formal 
legal truth”, to be distinguished in principle from actual or “substantive truth”: 
I define as “formal legal truth” whatever is found as fact by the legal fact-
finder (judge or lay jurors or both), whether it accords with substantive 
truth or not. (Summers 1999:498) 
Bednarek (2014), comparing American and Polish (inquisitorial) courtroom 
interaction, discusses aspects of how the adversarial formal legal truth 
approach is reflected in the courtroom examination style: 
In the United States, the process of examining witnesses and the search 
for the truth may be compared to the process of storytelling, owing to 
the fact that the prosecution and defense are allowed to present two 
different constructs of the events related to the crime, versions obtained 
through meticulous questioning of their witnesses. However, the process 
of examining witnesses and the search for the truth in Poland may not 
be compared to the process of telling a story […] the examination of 
witnesses is conducted by an impartial judge who represents neither the 
injured person nor the defendant. Such procedure is to guarantee an 
impartial trial and search for the objective truth. (Bednarek 2014:215)
Another consequence of the adversarial system of trial is a relatively high level 
of combativeness between the parties:
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‘Discrediting the witness’, ‘disgracing the witness’, ‘attacking’ the witness’s 
testimony, ‘pouncing’ if contradictions arise during the witness’s 
testimony [...] are typical aggressive actions characterizing the activity 
of the cross-examiner. (Biscetti 2006:216-217)
The formal and aggressive mode of interaction is linguistically visible on many 
parameters, including, it seems, parameters relating to interjections:
The whole point of the exchange is to solicit a response that will inform 
the jury, who are watching and listening and will eventually pass 
judgment on the case. This state of affairs is confirmed and reinforced 
by the attorney’s practice of not responding to the answers with “oh”, or 
indeed with any kind of receipt object (yeah, uh huh, etc.). (Heritage & 
Clayman 2010:175)
Examples of the prototypical aggressive adversarial examination style can 
be found in the O.J. Simpson trial transcripts from the 90’s, as illustrated in 
Example 1: 
Example 1:
Lawyer: Now, in 1989, when you had this altercation with Nicole, you had 
beaten Nicole in the past, hadn’t you?
Simpson: No. 
Lawyer: And in this 1989 incident, it was the last straw for Nicole, wasn’t 
it?
Simpson: No.
Lawyer: And she told you that, didn’t she? 
Simpson: No.
Lawyer: You had beaten her in the past, and on one occasion, you and she 
went to a doctor and lied about what happened, true? 
Simpson: No.
Lawyer: And told the doctor that she fell off a bicycle. True?
Note the salient lack of acknowledging response from the lawyer, who even 
introduces several questions by and, bluntly treating Simpson’s negative replies 
as if they were in fact affirmations.
2.2. The Continental inquisitorial courtroom
Civil law jurisdictions in Continental Europe are known to offer a less 
aggressive and more relaxed courtroom atmosphere than that of the 
adversarial courtroom, although such characterisations are typically based 
on personal experiences and general observations, rather than e.g. linguistic 
documentation:
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Anglo-American observers of the court scene are regularly struck 
by the rarity and the subdued nature of challenges to the witnesses’ 
credibility. If such a challenge occurs, it mainly focuses on the witness’s 
reliability with respect to facts to which he has been deposed and 
seldom escalates into a general attack on his character or reputation for 
truthfulness. With apparent insouciance, Continental courts freely rely 
on uninterrupted narrative accounts – the testimonial yield of relatively 
mild, unpenetrating interrogations. (Damaška 1997:80-81)
2.3. The Danish hybrid courtroom
The Danish system of trial is often characterized as a kind of hybrid between 
the adversarial and the inquisitorial system, since, on the one hand, Danish 
trials are organized in an adversarial-style participation pattern featuring two 
actively opposing sides and a fairly passive, impartial judge (Jacobsen 2002). 
On the other hand, the general atmosphere of the trials are less combative and 
perhaps more inclined to cooperation across sides in search for the truth:
[Some] civil law countries, including Italy and Denmark, provide for 
[an] extensive questioning regime, which bears some resemblance to 
adversarial cross-examination, although the judge retains very close 
control over the questions posed and generally ensures that witnesses 
are treated with respect. Most commentators agree that questioning is 
much less aggressive in form… (Doak, McGourlay & Thomas 2018:31)
While very little research exists on Danish courtroom interaction (see 
however Jacobsen 2002; Mortensen & Mortensen 2017), anecdotal reports 
seem to indicate that the examination style in Danish courts is unaggressive 
and casual:
… one of the salient differences [noticed by visiting judges from five 
European countries] is how informal everything is. You don’t have to 
ask for permission to speak or stand up, and there’s far more dialogue 
throughout than any of the visitors are used to from their home 
countries. It’s almost snug [orig. “hyggeligt”]. [My translation]. (Kæraa 
2011:25-26)
Still, observations of this kind remain more or less undocumented. The most 
extensive direct comparison of the interactional styles of the adversarial and 
the inquisitorial courtrooms is probably Bednarek (2014), quoted earlier. 
Bednarek employs three different linguistically oriented approaches for the 
comparison, but none of them seem to address the questions of formality or 
aggressiveness. Moreover, the comparison seems at risk of being skewed, as 
the American data are taken from the O.J. Simpson murder trial, while the 
Polish data are from a highly different petty robbery trial featuring a 17-year-
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old defendant. In what follows I will show how an investigation of lawyers’ use 
of interjections may illuminate key cultural differences, as discussed above, 
between the legal systems of the USA and Denmark. First, I will outline how 
interjections may be defined and understood in relation to the courtroom 
context.
3. The functions of interjections in courtroom interaction 
Hansen & Heltoft (2011:213) employ several criteria for their basic definition 
of interjections, displayed here in my adaptation:
• They are a word class with no inflectional options
• They can function as separate speech acts or as modifications of sur-
rounding speech acts
• They can be incorporated in the far left periphery of a sentence 
While interjections as a word class may often be associated with more or less 
uncontrolled expressions of emotion, e.g. ah, ugh, phew (Quirk et al. 1985:67), 
wow, yuk, phew (Matthews 2014), such outbursts are not the typical kinds of 
interjections observed in a courtroom. Rather, basic response words such as 
yes and no seem to prevail, since they are in many cases the default answers 
expected from witnesses and defendants during questioning. However, 
interjections, including response interjections, are also used by the examining 
lawyers themselves, which is the focus of this study. One way lawyers may 
use interjections is for evaluating the defendant’s answer by adding a third 
part to a question sequence (a practice first described for school teachers, cf. 
Sinclair & Coulthard 1975). Gibbons (2003) provides an example of this from 
a courtroom context:
Evaluative third parts may be used in legal settings to support or 
challenge answers to questions, for example:
C:  Would you agree with me that to be able to complete 
      that process the Defendant needs to read or     
      understand English?
P:  The Defendant didn’t read the record of Interview.
C:  No that wasn’t my question with respect. Questions
      at large ... (Gibbons 2003:124)
Moreover, based on Swedish courtroom data, Adelswärd, Aronsson & Linell 
(1988) comment on the supportive function such feedback signals may serve:
Courtroom examinations are, of course, rather constrained in that judges 
and lawyers keep asking questions and seldom comment on defendants’ 
answers or reciprocate information, whereas defendants respond to 
questions and only rarely take any kind of communicative initiative. 
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However, judges and lawyers do sometimes confirm or acknowledge 
defendants’ responses before moving on to their next question. The 
relative frequency of such feedback may therefore serve as one type 
of index of positive attention on the part of the legal professionals. 
(Adelswärd, Aronsson & Linell 1988:271-272)
To account for this social aspect of the interjectional functions, I invoke the 
general notion of foregrounding vs. backgrounding of “positive relational 
goals”, as discussed in relation to doctor-patient interactions by Coupland, 
Coupland & Robinson (1992).
  To distinguish between general functions of interjections, the semantic 
scope properties of interjections are a relevant criterion. Aijmer (2002), for 
instance, discusses two different functions of oh based on whether oh relates 
to preceding utterances or the following/current utterance: 
Backwards-looking oh is typically a response marker (reception 
marker) with information management tasks such as acknowledging 
and accepting new information or recognizing a correction. […] The 
forwards-looking particle oh can be associated with affect and has a 
reinforcing or intensifying function. For example, when oh occurs in the 
lexicalized combination oh God, the effect is stronger than if the speaker 
uses the simple God. (Aijmer 2002:99)
Hansen & Heltoft (2011) employ the notion of scope to account for such 
backward and forward operating orientations of interjections, and on this 
basis identify a plain response function of interjections as one involving 
simple backward scope:
Thus, in the function discussed so far, the response words are said to 
have scope to the left, anaphorical scope, as it were (Hansen & Heltoft 
2011:1121, my translation)
Moreover, like Aijmer, they identify an emotive/affective function of 
interjections, in which the interjection (if not used in isolation) has forward 
scope over the utterance it introduces. However, this interjectional function is 
not present in the data studied here.
Hansen & Heltoft furthermore delimit a group of interjections used by the 
speaker to indicate how adjacent utterances are to be understood in relation 
to each other or to points of view assumed present in the discourse (Hansen & 
Heltoft 2011:1131-1132). They provide the example jamen, a Danish interjection 
best translated as but (although but is a conjunction, not an interjection), 
which may be said to have bi-directional scope, in that it establishes a relation 
between discursive units. This is one of the key functions associated with the 
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notion of discourse markers (Schiffrin 1987) and, following Aijmer (2002:98), 
I will refer to it as the discourse-organizing function of interjections.
Finally, Hansen & Heltoft identify a more peripheral phatic function of 
interjections, exemplified with hesitation markers such as æh and øh ‘er’/’uh’, 
used for governing the interactional ‘floor’, i.e. essentially the communication 
channel (Jakobson 1960). Phatic interjections stand out by having no scope 
relations to the preceding or ensuing discourse.
Thus, a working typology of general interjectional functions based on scope 
relations may be outlined as in figure 1: 
Interjectional functions Scope relations
Plain response function Backward scope
Emotive function Forward scope
Discourse-organizing function Backward and forward scope
Phatic function No scope relation
Figure 1: Interjectional functions and scope relations
It is important to note, however, that these categories are fuzzy, in that 
interactional contributions are arguably always related somehow to aspects 
of the preceding and ensuing or expected discourse. In other words, no 
interjection is likely to be used for only one function and with a completely 
unambiguous scope relation in authentic interaction. For example, a plain 
response interjection, defined here as having backward scope, is often followed 
by an utterance confirming the response, e.g. ‘Are you married? Yes, I am / No, 
I’m single’, in which case it may be said to actually have bi-directional scope 
(Hansen & Heltoft 2011:1118). However, the words following the interjection 
are then restricted to conveying the same meaning as the interjection itself 
– a case of semantic reduplication, as it were – otherwise they would rather 
form a separate utterance, beyond the interjection’s scope, e.g. ‘Are you 
married? Yes, why do you ask? / No, I prefer living alone’. While for this reason 
I exclude ‘semantic reduplication’ from the notion of scope employed here, 
certainly borderline cases with unclear scope relations may still emerge, e.g. 
‘Are you married? Yes, I’m afraid I am’. In the data analyses presented below, 
my categorization of interjectional functions and scope relations necessarily 
involves a great deal of interpretation, and is based on what I regard as the 
most plausible or salient readings in each interactional context. The examples 
provided help illustrate how individual analyses have been carried out.  
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4. Lawyers’ use of interjections in trial examinations
4.1. Data and method   
The data collected for this study consists of transcribed audio/video recordings 
from a Danish as well as an American criminal trial, both related to physical 
violence. The Danish trial was conducted in August 2015 at the Court of 
Frederiksberg, Copenhagen, after which a copy of the court’s automated audio 
recording was provided to me. Prior to questioning the participants were asked 
for, and gave their, consent to the recording being used – in full anonymity 
– for linguistic research purposes. The American trial was conducted in 
March 2007 at the Oakland County Circuit Court, Michigan. The trial was 
video recorded and parts of the video recording were later made public by 
the defence lawyer’s firm on YouTube (ambroselawfirm 2008), from where 
I collected them. In the USA, court recordings are public domain material, 
meaning the video footage can legally be used for e.g. the present purpose, 
without the explicit individual consent of the participants.2
For both cases, only data from the interaction between the defendant and his 
lawyer in direct examination were chosen for analysis. Thus, in the Danish 
case, the entire direct examination of the defendant was chosen, whereas 
for the American data, approximately the first half of the examination was 
chosen3, roughly corresponding in total number of words spoken, see figure 
2 below. 
Words spoken4 Duration in seconds
DK data, total 1170 320
Defendant 516
Lawyer 654
US data, total 1053 405
Defendant 513
Lawyer 540
Figure 2: Data overview
The chosen excerpts were transcribed using CLAN transcription software, 
employing orthographic conventions as far as possible (cf. appendix 1). While 
orthographic transcription involves generalization, and therefore the risk of 
misrepresentation, it offers the benefit of allowing for quantitative analysis 
and comparison.
All interjections spoken by the defence lawyers in the Danish and the Amer-
ican data sets were manually singled out and individually coded for interjec-
tional functions, based on the typology outlined in figure 1 above. Interjec-
tions with unclear functions or functions not clearly covered by the typology 
were assigned to a residual category labelled ‘Indeterminable/other function’.
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In the following sections, for each of the two data sets I first present a quanti-
tative overview of the defence lawyer’s use of interjections, and then provide 
examples illustrating how the interjections function in interaction. Finally, I 
compare main characteristics of the American and the Danish lawyer’s use of 
interjections.  
4.2. The American defence lawyer’s use of interjections 
4.2.1. Quantitative overview
Beginning with the American defence lawyer, his use of interjections corre-
sponds well with the claim made by Heritage & Clayman (2010), as discussed 
in section 2.1., that receipt objects are not part of the typical register of trial 
examinations. Out of a total of 540 words spoken, the lawyer uses a mere 8 
tokens of interjections, corresponding to 1.5 interjections per 100 words. The 
interjections are: okay (x2), yeah, oh, so5 (x2) and now (x2). Figure 3 shows the 
8 interjections and how they are distributed across interjectional functions:
Figure 3: Interjections across functions – American data
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4.2.2. Plain response function – okay
As figure 3 illustrates, most of the interjections used by the American lawyer 
are used for discourse-organizing functions, while only one can be said to 
convey a plain response to the defendant’s statement, i.e. one of the occurrenc-
es of okay.6 This interjection is displayed in example 2:
Example 2:
Lawyer: is there any time when the c- (.) when your car is actually stopped
  (3.7) 
Defendant: yeah i- yeah it is stop and go there is
  times when the car is stopped 
  (0.4) 
Lawyer:  → okay (1.3) and at any time do you (1.1) the car that’s stopped in 
front of you does (.) does somebody get out of the car in front of 
you 
The interjection okay is (in)famously multifunctional (cf. e.g. Mortensen & 
Mortensen 2009; Gaines 2011) and may express, amongst others, the simple 
acceptance of new information (e.g. ‘okay, I see’), or an attempt to close/pause 
the topic at hand and introduce a new/intermediary topic (e.g. ‘okay, I need 
to go’). In example 2, while the topic is certainly developing, i.e. from the de-
fendant’s stopped car to the stopped car in front of him, the lawyer clearly in-
dicates, through the conjunction and, that his questions are to be understood 
as connected and belonging to the same line of reasoning. Hence, okay is not 
to be understood as a topic shifter, but as a simple expression of acknowledg-
ment of what the defendant says. Its scope, then, is backward (over the defen-
dant’s statement), which warrants the ‘plain response function’ categorization. 
Moreover, the fact that the nature of the response is acknowledgment rather 
than rejection is indicated by the subcategorization ‘positive’. The topic shifter 
variant of okay, on the other hand, which is not present in the American data, 
but in the Danish data, would constitute a ‘discourse-organizing function’, due 
to having both backward and forward scope. 
4.2.3. Discourse-organizing function – yeah and oh
While the interjections yeah and oh may often be used in plain response func-
tions (cf. Aijmer’s analysis, section 3 above), their use in this context is some-
what different. In addition to expressing the reception of the defendant’s pre-
vious utterance, they both serve to reorientate the interaction, as illustrated in 
examples 3 and 4:
Example 3:
Lawyer: and (.) what do you see when (0.5) they
  get out of that car 
  (1.6) 
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Defendant: they get out of the car they get out and they start walking back 
(0.5) towards my car stop the car (0.9) XXX then they get out 
and start walking back towards my car 
Lawyer:  → yeah I’m gonna ask you to (.) sit (1.1) in the seat up to the left 
(0.9) so you (1.2) can show the jury (1.1) what the driver does 
when he gets out of the car   
Example 4:
Defendant: it’s a Monte Carlo (1.5) it’s a: (.) eighty mid-eighties model 
  (4.7) 
Lawyer: these (0.6) how many people get out of the c- out of that Monte 
Carlo 
  (0.7) 
Defendant: two people (0.8) two guys 
  (2.2) 
Lawyer: this would represent XXX 
Defendant: XXX (indicating confusion)
Lawyer:  → oh the the car in front of you (pointing) (.) and your car okay 
  (0.9) 
Defendant: okay
In both examples, the interaction revolves around a car (a Chevrolet Monte 
Carlo) that stopped in front of the defendant’s car, and the lawyer has his client 
sit on chairs arranged as car seats to illustrate how individuals were located 
during the incident. In example 3, the lawyer uses yeah (pronounced with a 
vowel reduction and glottal stop) to assure his client that he is listening, while 
at the same time disrupting his testimony to direct him to a different chair. In 
example 4, the lawyer is explaining some details of the chair arrangement, and 
is interrupted by his client’s (inaudible) expression of confusion. The lawyer 
then uses oh to express that he has understood his client’s expression of con-
fusion/query for clarification, and to signal that his following utterances are to 
be understood as clarification. 
Thus, while both the interjections contain some kind of acknowledgment of 
the defendant’s talk, this is not their only or main function, as they basically 
serve a more transactional discourse-organizing purpose.
4.2.3. Discourse-organizing function – so and now 
The two remaining types of interjections used, twice each, by the American 
defence lawyer also occur in discourse-organizing functions as they, like yeah 
and oh, have both backward and forward scope. They differ, however, by not 
featuring explicit acknowledgment; all they do is steer the examination for-
ward, in different ways, as illustrated in example 5:
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Example 5:
Lawyer: and when you see him do that (.) can you hear what he’s saying 
to you 
   (.) 
Defendant: no 
   (1.2) 
Lawyer:   →  and so (1.1) the driver (2.3) gets out of  the car (.) walks back 
starts motioning saying something what do you do 
   (1.0)
Defendant: I crack my (.) door my driver’s side door (1.3) XXX I can’t roll 
my window down cause it’s broken so I crack the door to hear 
what he’s saying 
   (1.1) 
Lawyer: and when you crack your win- you crack your door (.) are you 
able to hear what he’s saying 
Defendant: yes 
   (.) 
Lawyer:   →  now what is he saying 
Prosecutor:  [prosecution] calls for hearsay
In the beginning of example 5, the lawyer uses so to introduce a summing up 
of what his client has told the court so far, in order to arrive at the next, min-
ute steps of the recount. After having established that the defendant cracked 
his door open and was able to hear the words of the person standing there, 
the lawyer then uses now to alert the court and his client of the pivotal status 
of his follow-up question. A similar function of now has been described as 
the marking of “proximization of threat” (Abuarrah 2016). Indeed, evoking a 
sense of fear and imminent threat to his client is a plausible defence strategy, 
which leads the prosecutor to interrupt the examination by objecting to the 
question.
Overall, the American defence lawyer’s direct examination of his client is 
characterized by limited use of interjections and the preponderance of dis-
course-organizing interjectional functions, all consistent with a fairly transac-
tional style of examination, where positive relational goals are backgrounded.
4.3. The Danish defence lawyer’s use of interjections 
4.3.1. Quantitative overview
Turning to the Danish data, a quite different picture emerges, as the Danish 
defence lawyer uses no less than 74 interjections out of 654 words spoken, 
amounting to 11.3 interjections per 100 words. The interjections are: ja ‘yes’ 
(x17), nej ‘no’/‘right’ (x10), mh ‘mh’/’uh-huh’ (x5), okay ‘okay’ (x21), altså ‘I 
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mean’/’you know’ (x9) and øh ‘er’ (x12). Figure 4 shows the 74 interjections 
and how they are distributed across interjectional functions:
Figure 4: Interjections across functions – Danish data
4.3.2. Plain response function – ja, nej, mh and okay
As illustrated, the majority of the interjections used by the Danish lawyer oc-
cur in various plain response functions – they include ja ‘yes’, nej ‘no’/’right’, 
mh ‘mh’/’uh-huh’ and most occurrences of okay ‘okay’, all illustrated in exam-
ple 6:
Example 67:
Lawyer: then you say s- ask can I pass through or something 
Defendant: yes 
Lawyer:  → ja (.) do they react? 
  (.) 
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Defendant: no 
Lawyer:  → nej 
Defendant: like they didn’t hear me 
Lawyer:  → okay and then you just walk through like you said before 
  ⌈that (.) you pressed⌉ through 
Defendant: ⌊that’s right yes⌋
  yes 
  (0.5) 
Lawyer: could it be that you made some movement with your foot or 
something you kno- 
Defendant: no 
  (0.6) 
Lawyer:  → you didn’t do that nej (.) ⌈okay⌉ 
Defendant:                                ⌊I just⌋ XXX 
  wanted to go away from there 
Lawyer:  → ja (.) okay (.) then you get down to the end of the stairway 
Defendant: uh-huh 
Lawyer: and we’ll also see in the video camera shortly that you get a cou-
ple of metres away 
Defendant: yes I told ⌈them⌉ to check ⌈the video camera⌉ 
Lawyer:  →               ⌊ja⌋                  ⌊ja⌋
Defendant: because it: ⌈I knew⌉ there were 
Lawyer:  →                  ⌊okay⌋                               
Defendant: video cameras ⌈there⌉ 
Lawyer:  →                           ⌊mh⌋ (.) then you said before that various things 
were shouted at you ⌈among others⌉ I’ll kill you or something 
Defendant:            ⌊yes⌋
  yes I’ll kill you  ⌈I’ll⌉ kill you 
Lawyer:  →                    ⌊ja⌋
As example 6 illustrates, throughout the examination the lawyer frequently 
offers affirmative feedback while his client speaks, i.e. through backchannel-
ling, as well as in turn transitions, i.e. in the form of evaluative third parts. 
In all cases the lawyer’s responses are positive, except for one occurrence of 
nej ‘no’, in which the lawyer corrects the defendant’s misunderstanding of his 
question, as shown in example 7:
Example 7:
Lawyer: how was it (.) you know ⌈said⌉ 
Defendant:                            ⌊yes⌋
Lawyer: or yelled or something 
Defendant: how I know 
Lawyer:  → er nej I’m saying er was it yelled loudly
Defendant: it was yelled loudly XXX 
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4.3.3. Discourse-organizing function – okay and altså
Like the American lawyer, the Danish defence lawyer occasionally employs 
interjections for discourse-organizing functions. This is the case for two oc-
currences of okay ‘okay’ and five occurrences of altså ‘I mean’/’you know’. Both 
types are represented in example 8:
Example 8:
Defendant: I was just scared they mustn’t come near ⌈me⌉ 
Lawyer:                                               ⌊mh⌋
         → okay but altså couldn’t you have run away
  (1.8) 
Defendant: no: that could they might also run after me right
Lawyer:  → yes (0.6) okay and then
  (0.7) 
Defendant: then he comes and is like (hissing sound) turns around what do 
you want 
 
The lawyer emphasizes the severity of the fear felt by his client through sug-
gesting the possibility of fleeing, thus ‘testing’ the defendant’s statement. In-
troducing the suggestion by altså ‘I mean’/’you know’ (in combination with 
the adversative conjunction men ‘but’) serves to mark the utterance as – os-
tensibly – opposing the defendant’s point of view.
After accepting the defendant’s explanation of why he did not run, the lawyer 
pauses and finally asks the defendant to continue his recount, employing the 
topic-shifter okay.
4.3.4. Phatic function – øh and altså
Finally, a group of interjections in the Danish data set are categorized as hav-
ing phatic function, as they do not have scope over the surrounding discourse. 
This function is realized mainly by øh ‘er’, as well as two occurrences of altså ‘I 
mean’/’you know’. Both these types are represented in example 9:
Example 9:
Lawyer:  →  and øh:: you said before that you didn’t think there was any 
blood on it (referring to the defendant’s ring) 
Defendant: there is nothing at all ⌈on it⌉ 
Lawyer:  →                                   ⌊no⌋ (0.6) but altså
                → øh:: let me just ask whi-
  which hand did you wear the ring on
The lawyer’s frequent use of phatic interjections may be seen as indicative of 
a fairly loose and unscripted mode of examination, which is consistent with 
his general examination style. The interjections used by the Danish defence 
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lawyer predominantly function as plain positive responses, serving to support 
his client’s testimony and to approximate – within the limits of the fairly rigid 
question-answer format – conversational norms characterizing  more casu-
al interviewing or conversation. Although the interpersonal relation between 
the lawyer and his client cannot be described as decidedly hearty, the lawyer’s 
extensive use of positive response interjections contributes to creating a talk-
ative atmosphere, backgrounding the transactional goals of the interaction. 
5. Conclusive comparison – from a legal cultural perspective
It has been commonly observed that Continental European courtroom inter-
action is of a far less aggressive and formal nature than that of Anglophone 
adversarial courtroom interaction. Studying the interjections used by profes-
sional representatives of the two different legal systems helps confirm, docu-
ment and explain this picture. Whereas the American defence lawyer serves 
his client’s interests by addressing him in a composed, professional and highly 
transactional manner, the Danish defence lawyer draws to a higher degree 
on relational resources, overtly displaying his acknowledgment of his client’s 
statements and motives.
This difference reflects the cultural values of the two legal systems in various 
ways. Obviously, the aggressive and confrontational nature of the adversarial 
system of trial is not as immediately visible in friendly direct examination dis-
course as it might have been if cross-examination had been the object of study. 
Still, the formal and composed transactional style featured in the American 
examination, as opposed to the relatively loose and casual Danish examina-
tion style, reflects the strong combative nature of American adversarialism, 
as the lawyer’s tight control of the interaction can be understood as a way to 
protect his client. Any unscripted piece of testimony may reveal weaknesses 
that can be exploited in damaging ways by the opposing party. In the Danish 
trial, the fact that the opposition is not likely to be as aggressive and directly 
confrontational seems to ease the atmosphere and reduce the lawyer’s urge for 
interactional control.
The two lawyers’ use and avoidance, respectively, of interjections may further-
more be understood in relation to the storytelling conception of adversarial 
courtroom examination, as pointed at in section 2.1. By expressing positive 
response and recognition throughout his examination, the Danish lawyer 
frames the defendant’s contributions as generally new and informative, al-
though he – and the rest of the court – is likely to know most of the details in 
advance. In the American examination, on the other hand, the testimony is 
treated not so much as actual information being exchanged but, embracing 
the fact that most of the participants know the evidence already, rather as ar-
tefacts, as it were, i.e. pieces of a story being recited and put to display.
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Finally, legal traditions are of course not developed and practiced in isolation 
from other cultural pressures. Indeed the differences observed here may also 
be viewed in the light of more basic languacultural traits, such as the anti-hi-
erarchical values said to permeate Danish/Scandinavian sociality, e.g.:
… social hierarchies are not marked. It is not good ‘tone’ in the Scan-
dinavian welfare states to show off, demonstrate wealth or superiority; 
hierarchies (even in businesses and organisations) are largely invisible 
or hidden… (Fredsted 2005:159)
In any case, knowing how to act convincingly in court, whether as a law pro-
fessional or as a lay person being questioned, is not only a matter of asking or 
answering questions in the right way, but also an exercise in understanding 
the culturally sensitive norms governing what goes on between the questions. 
This study of interjections sheds new light on these norms and the legal cul-
tural values that shape, reproduce and accommodate to them. 
Appendix 1: Transcription conventions
Pause  (0.2)
Overlap markers top   ⌈   ⌉
Overlap markers bottom   ⌊   ⌋
Inaudible   XXX
Anonymized item  [anonymized] 
Analytically significant line(s)  →
Analytically significant expression  okay
Appendix 2: Original Danish examples
Example 6:
Lawyer:  så sig- s- spørger du om må jeg komme forbi eller noget 
Defendant:  ja 
Lawyer:  →  ja (.) reagerer de på det 
   (.) 
Defendant:  nej 
Lawyer:  →  nej 
Defendant:  ligesom de ikke hørte mig 
Lawyer:  →  okay og så er det at du bare går igennem som du sagde før 
   ⌈at (.) du pressede⌉ dig igennem 
Defendant:   ⌊det er rigtigt ja⌋
   ja 
   (0.5) 
Lawyer:  kan du have lavet bevægelse med din fod et eller andet alts- 
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Defendant: nej 
  (0.6) 
Lawyer:  → det har du ikke gjort nej (.) ⌈okay⌉ 
Defendant:                                       ⌊jeg ville⌋
  XXX bare gået væk derfra 
Lawyer:  → ja (.) okay (.) så kommer du ned for enden af trappen 
Defendant: mh 
Lawyer: og vi kan også se lidt på videokameraet her lidt efterfølgende du 
kommer et par meter væk 
Defendant: ja jeg sagde ⌈de⌉ skulle se ⌈videokameraet⌉ 
Lawyer:  →                      ⌊ja⌋               ⌊ja⌋
Defendant: fordi det: ⌈jeg ved godt⌉ der var 
Lawyer:  →               ⌊okay⌋                               
Defendant: videokameraer  ⌈der⌉ 
Lawyer:  →                 ⌊mh⌋ (.) så sagde du før at der blev råbt nogle 
forskellige ting til dig ⌈blandt andet⌉ jeg dræber dig eller noget 
Defendant: ⌊ja⌋
  ja jeg slår dig ihjel ⌈jeg⌉ dræber dig 
Lawyer:                           ⌊ja⌋
Example 7:
Lawyer: hvordan blev det (.) altså ⌈sagt⌉
Defendant:                                 ⌊ja⌋
Lawyer: eller råbt eller noget 
Defendant: hvordan jeg ved det 
Lawyer:  → øh nej jeg siger øh blev det råbt højt 
Defendant: det blev råbt højt XXX 
 
Example 8:
Defendant: jeg var bare bange de skal ikke komme i nærheden 
  af ⌈mig⌉ 
Lawyer:  →      ⌊mh⌋ okay men altså kunne du ikke være løbet din vej 
  (1.8) 
Defendant: nej: det kunne de kunne også løbe efter mig jo ikke 
Lawyer:  → ja (0.6) okay og så 
  (0.7) 




Lawyer:  → og øh:: du sagde før at du syntes ikke at der var noget blod på 
den 
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Defendant: der er ikke noget som helst ⌈på den⌉ 
Lawyer:                                      ⌊nej⌋ (0.6) men 
         → altså øh:: jeg skal lige høre hvi- hvilken hånd havde du ringen på
Notes
1 This work has received financial support by The Danish Council for Independent 
Research: project ID DFF – 1321-00180.
2 Some ethical considerations are worth mentioning in this context. Under other 
circumstances, collecting, studying and publishing audio/video recordings of indi-
viduals without their explicit consent is not only illegal, but unethical. In this case, 
in addition to being public domain material and therefore legally publishable, the 
video recordings were first published on YouTube by the defence lawyer; I find it 
safe to assume that this was not done against his client’s will (the defendant and the 
defence lawyer are the only persons speaking in the data used for this study). Fur-
ther, as all individuals who speak or are referred to in the data excerpts displayed 
here are fully anonymized, the privacy of the participants is maintained to a higher 
degree than is the case in the original unedited YouTube clips that are openly avail-
able on the internet. 
3 The main reason for cutting out the second half of the examination is that this 
part – available in a separate YouTube clip – consists to a large extent of physical 
reenactment of events, rather than the ‘normal’ question-answer format which is 
more directly comparable with the Danish examination.
4 The word counts only include interaction between defendant and lawyer, i.e. 
occasional interactions involving other parties (judge and prosecutor) are left out.
5 The two occurrences of so in the data could alternatively be regarded as coordinat-
ing conjunctions instead of interjections, as there is no grammatical or phonetic 
evidence in favour of one or the other. Since the point here is that the American 
lawyer uses only few interjections, I find it reasonable to include borderline cases 
as interjections, in order not to boost the results.
6 The other occurrence, categorized as having an ’Indeterminable/other function’, 
is displayed in Example 3 below, where it is placed at the end of the lawyer’s last 
utterance, functioning as a tag question.
7 Danish examples are displayed in English translation, except for the interjections 
in question. The original transcriptions in Danish are available in appendix 2.
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